

Kristeva's Ontological Approach to Limit and Secondary Identification with the Mother

Abstract

I propose an ontological approach via Hegel to Kristeva's notion of archaic loss, specifically her theory of secondary identification with the mother. I argue that she elaborates the pre-Oedipal relation to the mother as part of the presupposition that Hegel's Modernity realizes history's empty transmission of trauma. Trauma functions as a critique of dialectic in crisis, by Derrida and Nancy, on the basis of Hegel's work of loss and the return of loss "for us." Because of Kristeva's work on the semiotic and signification, the implication of ontological loss in this approach also allows her to develop especially her view of sublimation in divergence, from Lacan's approach to Antigone and the limit of the human.

Keywords

desire, freedom, Antigone, Hegel, Kristeva

Julia Kristeva and Jean-Luc Nancy are two French thinkers who emphasize early Frankfurt School ideas concerning history "after" Hegel – that loss and the loss of loss returns "for us." Derivative of the thematic of loss in both thinkers is the work of the negative, but with important differences.

Kristeva's negativity claim (Stawarska 2017, 129–55) consists in ontologically processing the non-founded ground, the *arche-trace* (Kristeva [2005] 2010, 12–13) that will become the "object" (whether we term this conscience, desire, death) of recurrence, on which thought can posit itself as labor, and actualize being as transition from *assujettissante* "to" object (Derrida [1961] 2022, 23–27). With her theory of maternal abjection, she formulates an ontico-ontological differential approach to loss and mourning, which is a dependency not on a mental image, but on the actualization of incomplete being as a way of breaching the logic of the fixed limit. Kristeva's essay "Antigone

as Limit and Horizon,” which lies at the center of my argumentation, on *Até*, the idea of the porous border of the human, concerns this very methodological structure.

In other words, she posits a divergent theory of the thetic break, her deduction of thought as form developed in 1974. Accordingly, for her, Being as pure being containing an inborn *not*, in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, harbors rejection not only epistemologically but ontologically-normatively as well, “thought *and* the structure of being” (Houlgate 2006, 23–36; Thompson 2019). Ontological normativity is not simply that in Hegel, e.g., the objectivity of the ethical order, its customs and laws are “historically contingent” (Thompson 2019, 42). The system lacks a pregiven foundation, for it depends on the dynamic of a relational ontology: the co-positing between subjects, as being equally “right,” abstract right, objective spirit and morality, subjective spirit: “conscience” co-positing with the “good” are both “right” (Hegel 1991, §142). In Kristeva, this amounts to an inborn *not*, a negativity at the foundation of the signifying process of the subject, anchoring itself in the capacity for sublimation, an inner void as a bridge to language, the cost for experience to become possible.

Kristeva introduces the semiotic as part of a claim about signification, that through reconnecting with the void, the self empties itself out structurally, in thought as well as being (see Kristeva [1974] 1984; Lechte 1990). The signified of discourse, in other words, the “I” of phallic assumption or enunciation is inscriptive, but what determines the boundaries between subject and object, rather than a simple function, or a shifter between binaries, is a kind of being, constitutively capable of ruination, withdrawal from closure in the ego as pregiven norm of signification, thus forming a semiotic resistance. In the recurrence of the recursive signifier of Being as empty, as exposure to suffering, the speaking subject feels ill at ease in illness, rejection/negation, the sickness of “mourning sickness,” and “on trial.” “In calling the text a practice we must not forget that it is a new practice, radically different from the mechanistic practice of a null and void, atomistic subject who refuses to acknowledge that he [sic] is a *subject of language* [emphasis added]. Against such a ‘practice,’ the text as signifying practice points toward the possibility – which is a jouissance – of a *subject who speaks his [sic] being put in process/on trial through action*” (Kristeva 1984, 211; emphasis in original). Due to the recurrence of semiotic, rebellious forces of dissolution, the unity of

the signifier as posited in the synthesis of non-being and being proves to be larger than the self; this is always already so.

History's empty transmission, a trauma of secondary identification, with the mother at the beginning of fractured origins as thematic of the unstable discourse theoretically setting itself up as closed structure: this is more adequately akin to expressing Kristeva's approach of what it would be to read trauma as her method. The system of signification is her method. On the one hand, concerning the birth to presence of the modern subject, Jean-Luc Nancy and Kristeva share a common premise: with natality oblivion comes right away. On the other hand, Hannah Arendt and Kristeva share a common premise: with natality comes the unpredictability of "freedom." However, William Watkin is right about Kristeva's wariness that simply leaving it to freedom is too much too soon for the mental health of the child (Watkin 2003, 86–107). Accordingly, Kristeva has theorized abjection and melancholia; and has explicitly theorized the more complex "crime" of Antigone in Hegel as a philosophy of history.

To evaluate her Antigone, we need to ask precisely what is the kind of freedom to which Kristeva is indebted. I borrow my approach from "The Chiasmus of Action and Revolt: Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, and Gillian Rose," Sara Beardsworth's incisive argument about the impasse of the modern subject in Kristeva and Adorno (Beardsworth 2017, 43–67). On the subject of Antigone, other critics of Hegel, notably Judith Butler, have proposed that Hegel's identification of the divine law with the unconscious renders it *without* ontological status, i.e. as nonexistent (Butler 2000, 23–33). My reading, however, which is informed by Derrida as well as Kristeva, reveals that the problem is precisely the opposite. In identifying the divine law with the unconscious, Hegel grants it a definite ontological status: it is that which enables and underlies signification, and thus manifests for consciousness, in its own manner, concretely as human law. By attributing guilt in terms of intention toward the law, Hegel seems to disregard what must be said, on his own account, regarding the law's status and substance.

I. Kristeva and Nancy's Hegel

The idea governing this chapter is that, in much of the scholarship, Kristeva's approach in *Revolution in Poetic Language* has not been

interpreted as ontological; in particular, more attention is due to Hegel, above all *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, chapter 6. B, “Culture.” While readers have drawn the consequences of Kristeva’s remarkable analysis of Hegel’s “Force and Understanding” and Freud’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* as organizing division one of *Revolution in Poetic Language*, much less attention has been paid to just how deeply Kristeva is steeped in both Hegel’s *Culture* and *The Science of Logic*. Notably, the past two decades of Hegel scholarship have proven productive specifically in reading *The Philosophy of Right*, *The Science of Logic* and *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, taken together, on ontological grounds. The view that governs my reading is informed by ontological-epistemic work on Hegel (Zambrana 2015; Nuzzo 1999, 1–17). Those readers of Kristeva who have approached her focus on culture via Theodor Adorno (Sjöholm 2006) or via Hegel (Beardsworth 2004) have not sufficiently stressed the ontological element in Hegel as a question of method. What needs more attention is how to read what Kristeva develops as “oblique negation,” or “genuine negativity” in Hegel.

Putting death-in-life already holds true of Hegel’s putting body and soul in one, e.g., a shape, figure, sculpture, ratio, in the lectures on aesthetics. Nancy, in his version of negativity, which argues that, in Hegel, loss and the loss of loss return “for us,” comments on *partes extra partes* in Descartes, the theme of the Fourfold, and more generally on the Being of the human as being mortal-immortal (Morin 2022). He calls the truth of this shape of cognition the incorporeality of the body, namely the phenomenon of self-effacement of the body as origin (as a self-origin). Accordingly, he takes this “no” of the inscribing, meaning the “no” of negation, as a kind of writing, inscription, and this terminology, then, involves freedom’s excription.

Kristeva’s work on secondary identification with the mother shares some commonalities with Nancy, yet also has specificities that set it apart. In Kristeva, as Rosemary Balsam notes, the supple shape of cognition of deliasion, debinding through the death drive, is that of the grammatical form of chiasmus, “when you come I will already have left; and I will be leaving when you will no longer be here” (Balsam 2014, 87–100). In her own pioneering work, Beardsworth explains this same negativity as the modern subject’s stricture as well, more particularly as a form of maternal reliance, a tendential severance as confession (Beardsworth 2004). Chiasmus expresses the

logical aspect of the concept understood as recurrence, the negativity of incomplete being. On the basis of this incompleteness Kristeva posits desire's capacity for reversal, theorizing the philosophical form of a normativity of dependency relations on systematic foundations.

Notably, chiasmus as the shape of cognition of the incomplete resorts to the overfamiliarity of predicate contradiction, which need not amount to an objective contradiction. Beardsworth turns to the use of empty equivocation, following Adorno: "myth is already enlightenment; enlightenment will one day already revert to myth" (Beardsworth 2017, 60–65). Chiasmus is the aspect of analysis taken to its limit at which point we no longer have an identity proposition, e.g., myth either is or is not enlightenment; nevertheless, we may have still not achieved awareness of the banality, overfamiliarity of the contradiction. In early Kristeva, the use of chiasmus is part of her method. As Sid K. Hansen and Rebecca Tuvel likewise posit, "Just as the semiotic is already and not yet symbolic, the Symbolic is still but no longer semiotic; amid its logical and grammatical structures, there is the insistent presence of drives. [...] Poetry and avant-garde writing neither destroy the Symbolic nor allow semiotic drives to devolve into chaos" (Hansen and Tuvel 2017, 13).

I argue that Kristeva emulates Hegel in her approach to Antigone's deed (and to Jocasta), by availing herself of the richness of the shape of chiasmus. That is, in form we deal with the metamorphosis of the shape of forgiveness (morality, subjective spirit). Hegel sets up this latter shape of cognition of knowledge, both as the result of the logic of the concept (moving past Culture) and as indebtedness to incompleteness, a recurrence of negativity, taking back into existence the essence of the earlier shape (ethicality, objective spirit), i.e., tracing the deed from out of the totality of the idea in its pure unfolding. Antigone's action becomes unforgivable after Culture has mirrored it, showing its insufficiency. Against the backdrop of Culture, according to Hegel's chapter 6. B, the deed amounts to a translation into a revolutionary posture: a shockingly incongruous revolution, in the sense of a *philosophical* revolution. This form logically operates on the same level as what Watkin calls the poet's good old nostalgic longing for a lost authenticity. It is the form through which trauma enters as a logic of loss and return "for us." I will use the rest of this section to prepare an entry into the theme of forgiveness in Kristeva, by first taking it back to post-structuralist 1970s work on Antigone, starting with Derrida.

1. Introducing Derrida

In opening with Derrida, I briefly indicate what becomes of Hegel's idea of forgiveness (morality) if we approach it as interrupting thought and its acts, once both Antigone's deed (ethicality) and Culture have moved into the past. Going back to Derrida's work on Antigone, the passage between *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität* is a movement tied primarily to the introduction of difference/subjectivity into (symbolic) language. This is Derrida's analysis of the occasion of Antigone: "In terms of the logic of this passage, it is impossible to distinguish any longer between, on the one hand, the pleasure principle, and, on the other hand, a death drive that now appears not as the external but rather as the *internal* limitation or inhibition of the pleasure principle—that is, as the *telos* of pleasure" (Gearhart 1998, 64).

What makes it necessary that, in Hegel, there are structurally always two aspects to the movement's necessity actualizing a single temporal totality, the true Spirit's totality? How do we distinguish the one, the *Sittlichkeit* of the abstractness of law, from the other, the logic/desire for recognition, and the culminating movement of both in *Moralität*'s unity of the "one" with the "good" of forgiveness?

The totality of the human in Hegel is not a representational entity. In the first place, even if Antigone forgives Polynices, who fights outside of lawful boundaries and against the defenders of the *polis*, does Hegel's concept of the phenomenological logic of the *polis* reduce to "passage" "in time"? Alternatively, does it reduce to a logic of binary sexual difference and a logic of oppositions of determinate negations, where gender and race privilege patriarchy, ever free of the risk of the logic of supplementarity of spurious nonoppositional opposites? Evidently not. In Hegel, the totality of the human grasps its own essence as consummating the essential development of substance, thought opposing itself to itself as something irreducible to actually present being as Substance (Hegel 1977, M18).

If Antigone and Polynices are not complete totalities, both quite other to extant external reality, should we not have to see them both and individually, successively and consequentially as unified first of all as temporal totalities turning toward each other, demanding to be "brought together" as "one" temporal totality differentially? And shall we thus think together the difference of this more composite "one" as unfolding the figure of the indivisible remainder of the human totality more inceptively (*Ursprung*) (Nancy 2000, 70; see Hegel 1977, M164)? I

am proposing that the two are to be thought as but “one” human totality, immanent to a playful ahistorical emergence and origin, and thus in the fragment the two are to be “thought together.” Only in this way does it make sense to say that thought and the essence of thought, co-emerging and in co-belonging, are both committed to the materiality of site and origin.

If we are to recognize the role that the debt to incalculable singularity plays in Hegel (Hegel 1977, ix–xi) – with Derrida and Nancy – we need to agree on this: Indeed Polynices’ death activates Antigone’s desire (i.e. through her deed of giving her brother a proper burial, which the laws of the *polis* and her uncle Creon prohibit). But this means that his death activates the unique (political) prevention against the deadlock of time falling into the flatness of the legible “now” of *Jetztzeit*, so what is here activated is *not* really a passage into time (but cf. *Zeitigung/Zeitlichkeit* and *Ereignis*) (Nelson 2014, 51–75).

As I want to show, Hegel refers the “truth” of ethical substance to a concern for the more essential truth that also pertains to the incorporeal, auto-hetero-affective and impermeable essence of “substance.” We have shown that this affective regime of interaction between two (I/You) “refuses” to reduce affective identification to overt levels – of actually extant “being” – the always finite existence of such derivative, conceptual unities as the intuitive, the political, or the familial.

2. Introducing Nancy

Nancy, following in the footsteps of Derrida, offers the hypothesis of a more complex humanism in Hegel. For my reconstruction of Nancy (via Lacoue-Labarthe), the prehistory of Antigone’s entrance into Hegel is most important – Sophocles’ trilogy. A German translation of the trilogy appeared around 1804, at approximately the same time that Hegel, a friend of the translator, the poet Hölderlin, was completing work on *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 208–36). Hölderlin himself points to a “hyperbologic” at play, naming its property “caesura,” *Zäsur*. Having completed the translation, he remained preoccupied by Sophocles’ three-part tragedy, to the extent that he changed the order of the plays when they appeared, putting *Oedipus Rex* first as an introduction, followed by *Antigone*. Represented by a figure or sign in poetics, the *Zäsur* is a term from metrics that refers to discord, lack of articulation, cut, a suspension or “catastrophic” alternation of representations, a “pure word” that

enables the opening up of the play of aletheaic structure, absence/presence, concealment/unconcealment (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 228). Hölderlin saw Oedipus as the incarnation of the “demented quest for consciousness” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 228) or, as Lacoue-Labarthe comments on it, the “madness of knowledge,” the “madness of self-consciousness” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 234). Yet *Antigone* speaks differently to Hölderlin, there is something which makes him go back to Aristotle’s theory of mimesis in the *Poetics*, and reinterpret it away from its emphasis on imitation, the “spectacular” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 232) relation to the subject of tragedy, and the effect of dramatic utterance in the theory of catharsis – leaning instead in the direction of “regression,” or the “reversal of idealism,” of the “good” associated with Plato (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 233).

On Nancy’s view, this positioning of *Antigone* after *Oedipus* in the trilogy matters to Hegel. For the poet Hölderlin, Sophocles’ *Antigone* comes to stand as the exemplary case of the appropriation of a divine position, for she positions herself against Creon and the rules of the city, thus presupposing the “appropriation of the right to institute difference by oneself” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 233). And yet, *Antigone* “errs,” “suffers,” rather than transgresses the human limit in the manner typical of a tragic hero – one who “desires difference and exclusion excludes himself, and suffers, to the point of irreversible loss” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 233). As Greek tragedy is about “expulsion,” and thus about transgression generally, the question that Hölderlin ponders in his “return” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 229) to Sophocles’ *Antigone* is the clue to Nancy’s commentary on Hegel.

For Nancy, this question is monstrous to us: How is one, how are we, even to seek to forgive the “crime” of *Antigone*? *Antigone* does not stand for the aspect of forgiveness that is made in the symbol of modern humanity, and which can henceforth speak in the name of the law bringing about totality (recall Derrida’s first aspect below). For what or who are we remembering, were we to suppose the law in Derrida’s first aspect – who or what is *Antigone* vis-à-vis the recognizable symbol of this “humanity that needs to forgive itself that [crime] and continue living while believing in the Power of ‘the laws of the spirit’” (Derrida 2001, 32).

Antigone’s crime does not assume the form of transgression, and is not explicitly concerned with the particularities of instituting difference by oneself, as is the case with the decidedly “modern”

(Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 228) tragic personality of Oedipus that “goes into particulars,” offering up a religious and sacrificial interpretation of the social ill. For Hölderlin, the “fable” of Oedipus is recognizably a humanism, its symbol, set as a “trial of heresy,” the tragic fault falling with the individual who “*interprets too infinitely* the word of the oracle and in which he is *tempted in the direction of the nefas*. [The transgression, the sacrilege, is thus the excess of interpretation]” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 233; emphasis in original).

Rather, I suggest Nancy draws from Derrida’s second aspect of forgiveness, and radically. For Nancy, the concern with “crime” (not transgression) in *Antigone*, as well as the change of order and topic in Hölderlin, and in Hegel, signals this: With *Antigone*, Sophocles undertakes to expose the aesthetic theory of “denegation” of Aristotelian mimetology of the original, copy and catharsis, including the experience of guilt as purification according to the spectacular (imitative) relation to the subject. In other words, the very case of Antigone is different.

To generalize, interest in the “denegation” of mimetology, the imitative relation to the auto-affective subject (the theory of self-affection in Kant’s *Gemüt* and a utopian description of the will) here signals that, unless we fully grasp the art of undoing the schematism of imagination that Antigone’s deed stands for, we will misunderstand Nancy’s Hegel. Giving mind to Derrida’s second aspect of forgiveness, we here see, I claim, a Hegel for whom the sharpening of the metaphysical question contributes to the very notion of forgiveness that the *Phenomenology* introduces, as a question of ethics as “first” philosophy. Derrida asks regarding this more profound role: “to begin from the fact that yes, there is the unforgivable. Is this not, in truth, the only thing to forgive? The only thing in truth that *calls for forgiveness*” (Derrida 2001, 32; emphasis in original). What is, then, meant by this question?

For Nancy the denegation that Antigone’s “deed”/“crime” introduces occurs at the same level as that played by the role of memory and history as constructions, as constructed symbols. And role they must play in the ways of art when it is “great art,” i.e. emerging in the states of affairs of the social partnership tied to the site and origin of the historical appearance of human community (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft/Sittliche Gemeinschaft*). That is to say, the deed introduces the emergence “into” consciousness, the birth of finite thinking “into” being, but as an

internal rupture within essentially human states of affairs, whose very existence is, in turn, better grasped as emerging from unforgivable deeds. So, in Hegel, forgiveness introduces a difference (the excess of the love-death relation) into symbolic constructions (history and memory), and bases these on “various aspects of love,” inherent in the material concern for the other.

Hegel in Nancy, surely, is indebted to what Lacoue-Labarthe names the poetic device of the caesura: the deployment by the poet of the negativity of the suffering “introduces in its doubling of the dialectical-sacrificial process [the hyperbologic] in such a way as to prevent its culmination and paralyze it *from within*” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 233; emphasis in original). A special meaning, an “absence of ‘moment’” attaches to preventing this culmination of the conflict, the contradiction, the tragic guilt, and simultaneously to paralyzing it from within. Lacoue-Labarthe ponders further: “the more the tragic is identified with the speculative desire for the infinite and the divine, the more tragedy presents it as a casting into separation, differentiation, finitude. Tragedy, then, is the catharsis of the speculative” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 232). In short, since historical Absolutism is confounded with German Romanticism, it is the romanticization of the artwork as incarnation of the absolute that Hegel targets.

To sum up. With respect to the first or totalizing aspect of forgiveness, above, Nancy claims that Hegel surely chastises the Romantic individual as it relates to Antigone conceived as Romantic ideal. In Hegel’s chapter 6, the Substantiality of the individual as incarnation of the idea, the “ethical totality” of Essence or Substance as Subject, as depicted in Antigone’s guilt, serves to set the standard of completion of the Concept. But with respect to the second aspect, or, the radical empiricist and the deconstructive, “making-material” aspect of memory and history, we must also account for how Antigone’s crime adheres to and inscribes Hegel’s own generative logic and its tripartite syllogism of man, nature, art. In our view, to read the tripartite syllogism this way amounts to exculpating Hegel as regards the question of the radicalization of the debt owed to incalculable singularity, with two important consequences. First, we recognize that this debt is nothing other than evidence that, for Hegel, “the unification of the concept with empirical existence cannot be explained by anything external to the System” (Malabou 2005, 18). And, second, for Hegel, this very rule that “nothing is explained by anything external to the system” is to

be thought as inscription of finite materiality, at the same level as the “evidence of [plasticity’s] distinct mode of presence, which is that of the originary synthesis, maintained only in the interval between presence and absence [...] accounting for the incarnation, or the incorporation of spirit” (Malabou 2005, 18).

3. Implications

The above argument about the system will lead Nancy to conclude that there is a view from a-cosmogony in Hegel, the creation of the world. In Kristeva, ontology runs parallel to this, in the logic of rupture, limit and horizon, around Antigone.

In general, we have proposed that it is only this complicated conception of Antigone that leads Hegel to reason that she makes of death “the result of an act *consciously done*” (Hegel 1977, M453; emphasis in original). Antigone’s deed is the founding moment of the “true [*eigentliche, ursprüngliche*] spirit,” thus become identical with “the right of consciousness to be asserted in it [the something done]” (Hegel 1977, M452). This temporal totality of the event of subjectivity paradoxically introduces both freedom (metaphysics) and political difference (physics), without opposition, on the level of and at the heart of the system’s limit. If it is indeed the case that both are openings from the same source and origin of *Phusis*, it follows that we must think the two together as, at the same time, opening to the Law of the uniquely human polis of the human community, and simultaneously opening to the clue of Antigone’s deed; and, thus, preventing closure so that the “future will [...] be the present which will then become the present past or the past present” (Derrida 2005, xix)

Thus, in Nancy, the “guilt” associated with Antigone in Hegel’s chapter 6, though singular, paradoxically belongs to two sets of values at once, two cultural-historical epochs, the modern Romantic theory of individuality, “speculative suicide” or sacrifice, and at the same time, the ancient mimetic theory of catharsis, the purification of passion, tragic effect or guilt. But according to the “same” law it also belongs to neither (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 222).

Is it possible to exculpate Hegel, then? Can Hegel’s Subject reflect on the entire process of its formation? Does Hegel offer the concept as ready-made synthesis? (This is what Judith Butler asks in relation to Hegel’s Antigone.) Before moving to Kristeva, I have to address this matter of clarification. I will do so via a brief detour through Lacan. In

Bodies That Matter, Butler says that in Hegel, the “subject [can] reflect on the entire process of its formation” (Butler 1993, 76). However, Butler is wrong that Hegel sides with the State and therefore errs vis-à-vis, e.g., sexual difference (*Antigone’s Claim*).

Butler writes this in a deeply Hegelian study of Lacan that treats him as too Hegelian. I give two lengthy quotations. In Butler’s own words, “The Lacanian position suggests not only that identifications *precede* the ego, but that the identificatory relation to the image establishes the ego. *Moreover, the ego established through this identificatory relation is itself a relation, indeed the cumulative history of such relations* [emphasis added]. As a result, the ego is not a self-identical substance, but a sedimented history of imaginary relations which locate the center of the ego outside itself, in the externalized *imago* which confers and produces bodily contours. In this sense, Lacan’s mirror does not reflect or represent a preexisting ego, but, rather, provides the frame, the boundary, the spatial delineation for the projective elaboration of the ego itself. Hence, Lacan claims, ‘the image of the body gives the subject the first form which allows him [sic] to locate what pertains to the ego [“*ce qui est du moi*”] and what does not”’ (Butler 1993, 74)

This section has demonstrated that Hegel is crucial to evaluating Lacan’s mirror as providing something like the frame, the boundary, the spatial delineation for the projective delineation of the ego itself. Kristeva’s 1974 critique of metalanguage in favor of the earliest mimetic identification with the mother involves the exercise of negativity. Lacan’s point coincides with assigning Hegel’s theory of negativity value as a point of necessity or dialectic with its immanent cancellation, simultaneously with it being paralyzed from within. Lacoue-Labarthe, as well as Nancy, ponders Hegel’s peculiar position on negativity, the catharsis of the speculative: “the more the tragic is identified with the speculative desire for the infinite and the divine, the more tragedy presents it as a casting into separation, differentiation, finitude. Tragedy, then, is the catharsis of the speculative” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998, 232). It will be seen below that Kristeva’s theory of secondary identification with the mother allows for a more radical conception of negativity and the ontico-ontological difference via Adorno, on the model of the Unhappy Consciousness, which allows the projective elaboration of an ideality in excess of the ego itself, preparatory for a pre-Oedipal Antigone.

II. Kristeva and Secondary Identification

I draw from Kristeva's less well-known essay, "Antigone: Limit and Horizon," from the early 2000s, a contribution to a collection of feminist readings of *Antigone*. We find Antigone positioned in the temporal event, "at the limit state of an indivisible identity" (viz. "the triumph of sublimation at the edge of an originary repression, at the frontier of life, that the speaking individual experiences as a going outside of the self" [Kristeva 2010, 218]), a "focal point," a "between," the suspension of an indefinite relation between potentiality and actuality. Kristeva qualifies this practically unqualifiable relation as a more complex negation or rejection: "indifference can flash out even in the midst of care, and the abjection of life can perpetuate itself in an insane disobedience that regenerates the social bond" (Kristeva 2010, 218). I will draw attention in particular to the use of indifference that "can flash out even in care" and abjection of life as a surrogate of "the uncompromising death drive" (Kristeva 2010, 218), that even as it perpetuates in "disobedience" can "regenerate the social bond."

Does Kristeva have a viable response to the Arendtian challenge of existential boredom and leveling, that the egalitarian law totalizing the public domain of Culture, Hegel's modernity, knows no exception, that is, leaves the private entirely out? I situate Kristeva with Arendt, which I explain via Adorno and Benjamin below, in order to arrive at her modification of Hegel, in the final account.

According to Fanny Söderbäck, the editor of the collection in which Kristeva's essay appeared, Kristeva emphasizes the "role of [the] maternal figure as she, for the first time, engages in an extended discussion of *Antigone*" (Söderbäck 2010, 12). This reading is in a league of its own. "While Butler [another contributor] skillfully demonstrates that Antigone 'occupies, linguistically, every kin position *except* 'mother,'" and while Cavarero (also in the volume) notes that Antigone inhabits the position of sister and daughter, and not wife and mother (a rare phenomenon in Greek drama), Kristeva—in the final chapter of this volume [. . .] argues that it is precisely the maternal position that our heroine desires to inhabit" (Söderbäck 2010, 12). Although Antigone indeed dies without children and is not a wife, Kristeva nonetheless claims approaching her through secondary identification with the maternal figure is the better reading, as I wish to claim.

More generally, I argue that Kristeva's ethics of Antigone adopts something approximating the second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative. Leonard Lawlor describes it succinctly: "never to treat the person in oneself or in others merely as a means, but always as an end in itself" (Lawlor 2016, 270–71); and provides a variant: "Let Others be Ends in Themselves" (Lawlor 2016, 269). That is, the reader is to grasp the imperative as deriving from the implication of the material inclusion of each and every one in the set of the multitude of individuals. And must know and not forget that "[i]ntensification brings us to the [more complicated experience of freeing up, *Gelassenheit*, a negativity that binds and intensifies] *essence*" (Lawlor 2016, 269). In other words, we shall treat Kristeva's Antigone as the speaking subject who, in speaking out, crosses the chiasmus with or in the "language of being" – a figure very similar to the proviso in Sara Beardsworth's grammatical chiasmus. Grammatical chiasmus entails the condition that, through the language of "dual semiotic authority," the "speaking subject" opens to the exposure of knowledge as experience of the discrepancy (the vulnerability of alterity), to the negativity of this "passion" (pain, suffering), the "crux." Just what might this "crux" be?

Indifference "can flash out even in the midst of care," and it can even take the shape of the "abjection of life" and, in a paroxysm, regenerate the ties of the social bond. To begin with, we recognize that along with Lacan's instruction, "Do not give way on your desire," the model here presents desire's double reversal, Kristeva's revival of hysteria as neurosis. Yet this is still indebted to Lacan. Kristeva maintains that Antigone does not flee from sickness, she "flees *into* death": "a reading of sickness [...] which the common sense of various translators (before Lacan) [...] usually, and wrongly, assume[s] that human beings can only 'flee *from* the disease'" (Kristeva 2010, 223–24). Antigone is, then, a case of pseudo-sickness. It is not sickness as "common sense" understands it; her sickness is a "sacred trick" (*amêkhanón*), and it is "more than a defense" [...] adds Lacan, as the symptom of an unconscious revolt or of an unbearable desire, through which the daughter of Oedipus escapes from both human and divine laws" (Kristeva 2010, 224).

1. Introducing Arendt's Modernity via Adorno's Hegel

Arendt's observations on the modern age provide a theoretical, Kantian context for the philosophical discussion of the singularity of suffering and the need for a spectator as well. For Kant, and his

bourgeois citizen as subject of the moral law, the subject of modernity, the plurality of the human condition is the condition of the possibility of action. But for the individual as the agent transgressing the limits of the ethico-political order, and the unique human *polis* to be thought as such, requires the spacing of a precarious intervention, which alone is capable of rendering time consistent with this condition. For Ewa Ziarek and Cecilia Sjöholm, as for Kristeva, Antigone in Arendt is a new beginning, a new narrative, and a new action. This is, paradoxically, a striking claim in Arendt, for survival here includes the spectator. I have developed the point elsewhere, but here I wish to emphasize the very idea of the “onlooker,” inverting the theory of Kant’s Copernican revolution, which functions as a means of regressing, a retroactive self-grounding, negativity, and a revival of the value of alienation that concentrates the objective analysis of the impasse of modernity. This inverted theory of the spectator informs Adorno’s variant of Hegel’s Culture, explaining the spectator as figuring the impasse as the “dialectic” in the crisis of the Enlightenment. The subject of the plural condition of the *polis* returns us to “Force and Understanding,” as put to work by Kristeva, helping the assessment of her transition from Kant “to” Hegel.

To make the point differently, Antigone is (as also in Hegel) the one in whom the law of ethical substance does not coincide with itself. Kristeva points out that Antigone flees into death, following the necessity of this non-coincidence, and assumes the shape of the “eclipse” of the whole layer of suffering, the way that affective labor invests the form of Nature, and then is barbarized, in Hegel (Adorno): paving the path to civilization. How does Antigone, who flees into death, follow the necessity of this non-coincidence? For instance, assuming Arendt’s viewpoint, Kristeva writes:

We must acknowledge that the actor himself, no matter how heroic his exploits themselves may be, cannot constitute wonderful action. Action is wonderful only if it is memorable. And where should we search for memory? The spectators are the ones who “accomplish” history, thanks to a thought that follows the act. This accomplishment takes place through recollection, without which there is simply nothing to recount. It is not the actors but spectators ... who make the polis a productive place to organize memory and/ history and stories. (Qtd. in Söderbäck 2010a, 71)

Kristeva's Arendtian point is that the "spectator," classically looking "in" from the "outside" for a lost intimacy and, in some sense, "suffering" – both are necessary; yet the abjection of life, a flash of indifference (e.g., the inseparability, the invisibility of the other's witness, the loss of loss) is necessary too. What is called the "accomplishment" of history could only take place if the shock value of the experience were felt, i.e., to displace estrangement, if it "takes place through recollection." Fanny Söderbäck summarizes this point: "Political action, we might say following Arendt, unfolds in three steps: first in an action, then in the witnessing of this action, and finally in the memory and commemoration of it. Heroic deeds only attain full significance if they are witnessed by spectators who are willing to remember and recount them" (Söderbäck 2010a, 71).

At this point a new question emerges: How does Antigone meet the narrativity criterion and how does Kristeva satisfactorily answer the challenge that she identifies Antigone with Jocasta, the maternal figure (as already mentioned, this sets Kristeva apart from other feminist readers)?

1. Kristeva's Defense of Arendt Regarding the Need of the Spectator

As a point of access to my answers, I will use Herder's invocation *contra* Hegel (cf. Söderbäck 2010a, 65–83): the "need to reverse everything" and "everything must be reversed." I do this with an eye to demonstrating how Kristeva might situate herself *contra* the historicist school. Kristeva opposes the latter, and I wish to enter the further nuance, below, that Hegel, also opposes the historicist. Before reaching this goal, I want to make three points.

My first point, which I develop in some detail, concerns the opposition to the historicist. Giambattista Vico was the first to assert, in the eighteenth century, that human beings are, as it were, blind to the effects of their own actions, but obey the tug of history and Providence achieves its own purposes through them. This is precisely the idea that Hegel subsequently made famous under the name of the "cunning of reason." According to Hegel, objective spirit, the world spirit, prevails by dint of the passions and needs of mankind. But in Hegel's objective spirit, the idea of reflection of the mind, the self-knowing subject, is not alien.

Against the historicist, Kristeva recasts the idea of Hegel's court of judgment. It is "through the dialectic that the universal spirit, the spirit of the world, produces itself in its freedom from all limits, and it is

this spirit which exercises its right—which is the highest right of all—over finite spirits in world history as the world’s court of judgement [*Weltgericht*]” (Hegel 1991, §341). The passage that informs Kristeva’s essay on Antigone is from Hegel’s chapter 6. A, Ethical Action: “Just as previously only the Penates succumbed to the national Spirit, so now the *living* spirits of the nation succumb through their own individuality and perish in an *universal* community, whose simple universality is soulless and dead, and is alive only in the *single* individual qua single. The ethical shape of Spirit has vanished and another takes its place” (Hegel 1977, M475). What happens when we resist the historicist, as Hegel does, and simultaneously add a variant, also resisting the opposition, like Hölderlin proposed, with Hegel neutralizing a more genuine relationship to reality?

Kristeva’s Hegel preserves Hölderlin. The question rather becomes how Hölderlin’s “genuine relationship to reality, critical and utopian” (Adorno 2008, 290) is retained via Hegel. This is not to say that we are left with accepting the romanticization of the individual, and a romanticizing of Antigone.

Arendt is against the romanticization of the individual – and Söderbäck and Sjöholm agree with this, and resort to Herder. Invoking Arendt and Kristeva on the need to salvage the silence of the spectator, Söderbäck resorts to Herder *contra* Hegel, understandably. Antigone is confined to the “domestic.”

Rightly, then, Söderbäck draws on the private, silent space of a suffering subjectivity from Arendt. To clarify. As I developed the point in the first section, Hegel’s Antigone must be taken as both an ancient and modern individual (paradoxically, as Lacoue-Labarthe notes, belonging to *two cultural epochs at once and yet belonging to neither*), as indeed Hegel uses *hyperbologically*, interchangeably, *Sittliche Gemeinschaft* and *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. For Kant, the autonomy of practical reason as legislator and lawgiver, this agent of modernity and Enlightenment, is on Arendt’s view the bourgeois citizen. The ruler/ruled relation between the government and the citizen does not involve deciding, agreeing – the objective appearance of the political is premised on the possibility of foreclosure of the symbol, as well as resistance. Arendt’s point is that, since Aristotle, the law of the *polis* stands for the activity of the builder, acting as law-making. Building the laws of the *polis* is like the citizen building a home for the family. A home, a dwelling place, is a dwelling poetically, in the first place

ontico-ontologically and differentially, creating symbols, and only then a construct, a building.

That is, the condition of plurality, as thoroughly unfolded in eighteenth-century France, according to Arendt's notation, and *more ambiguously via Hegel's hyperbology*, demands that public space be utterly egalitarian; "freedom" added to "equality." Accordingly, private space is not a binary or opposed to the public. It remains the space of "resistance" and so remains the witness of the other (barbarity is what "man" has done with "nature"). In this hyperbology, not an identity proposition, not even a contradiction between public and private, Kristeva finds a way to work with negation/rejection, her 1974 normativity of "genuine negativity" turned into a theory of abjection in 1980, and of melancholia in 1987, and of intimate revolt by the mid-1990s.

My second point on hyperbology supports the aim that is Arendt's concern. Hegel leveled charges against the historicist for misconstruing the self-knowing subject. In *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel levels an objection against Herder from a position which he calls the cognition of the Absolute: "Herder's way of doing philosophy is only a slight modification of this typical pattern. The *Absolute cannot be tolerated in the form that it has for rational cognition*, but only in a game with concepts of reflection, or in sporadic invocations which bring philosophy directly to an end, just as these seem to be about to begin it – even as *Kant ends with the Idea as practical faith. Or else the rational can only be tolerated as beautiful feeling (Empfindung)*, as instinct, as individuality" (qtd. in Adorno 2008, 284; emphasis added).

Thirdly, Kristeva's requirement of recollection as narrativity, regarding the writers of history, is decisive for Söderbäck. The concern is the aggrandizement of a monolithic history by instrumental reason. So Adorno warns against "the totality on the road to self-realization." Benjamin answers his own question: "with whom does historicism actually sympathize? *The answer is inevitable: with the victor*. All rulers are the heirs of prior conquerors. Hence, empathizing with the victor invariably benefits the current rulers" (qtd. in Adorno 2008, 277; emphasis added).

2. Kristeva's Antigone and History's Empty Transmission of Trauma

In this part I draw from Kristeva's text the two kinds of sovereign, itself a form of the double reversal of desire, the perversion of the

mother-child link, that Kristeva identifies in the study of the pre-Oedipal mother-daughter relationship.

Addressing Antigone, Kristeva writes: “It was, therefore, necessary that the desire to reunite with your family in death, foreshadowed at the beginning of the play [...] already be inscribed in the name of the heroine: against the Mother [*contre la Mère*] and/or *in her place*. In order to be free, or at least autonomous [a sovereign individual], you consecrate yourself, Antigone, to incarnating the death of the desire for life, Eros’ double [*doublure*] [death drive’s de-binding (*déliation*)]” (Kristeva 2010, 221; emphasis in original). Kristeva’s point here is that we distinguish between at least two kinds of sovereign. First: “Sovereignty obtained by means of exclusion (*anti*) [as if citing Judith Butler] is always ready to abolish itself in a sudden annulment of itself” (Kristeva 2010, 219). Still another (“mature”) sovereign emerges in the argument over *dike* between Creon and Antigone. This leads Kristeva to observe: “the triumph of sublimation at the edge of an originary repression, at the frontier of life, that the speaking individual experiences as a going outside of the self—the limit state of an indivisible identity. Mature, sovereign” (Kristeva 2010, 218). Let us unpack the above propositions. I will make four points.

In the first place, *Até* is the limit of the human. In a way, as I claimed via Nancy, Antigone and Polynices are the outermost limit of the human, the empirical concept of the *polis* as expressive of the idea of human totality. Yet when Kristeva says that Antigone has already transgressed and yet still does not transgress the limit, since, structured as an *arche*-trace, it is barely sensible (the “symptom of unbearable desire,” “revolt”), she means, as Beardsworth argues, an “anticipatory structure.” This structure is anticipatory since it sets itself up as the surrogate of a boundary, a determinate negation, loss, and the loss of loss, the ego grasped as borderline, if language is to have a history. The reason for this is that death-in-life, making the temporality of death cohabit with the place of the living, the space of life as the limit and horizon on which Being stands, is not traversed. Inhibiting the life drive will ensure entrance into language; conversely, moving outside of it, the life drive is traversed.

My second point is identical to Lacan’s about Culture in Hegel. In 1953, Lacan claimed that, in the chapter on Desire, “Lordship and Bondage,” in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the classical dialectic of desire and recognition is intersubjective; the master and slave relation

is an imaginary one, as we noted about the mirror stage above. And yet, as Kristeva also agrees, in the previous chapters, specifically in “Force and Understanding,” Hegel logically posits a foundation of presuppositionless thinking as the beginning of any properly “scientific” (*wissenschaftlich*) dialectical thought, taken as pure being, “that” it is, and consequently a relational ontological form of desire, a “genuine negativity.” This more durable form of desire, I argue, becomes the correlate of Kristeva’s underlying idea of the rebellious motility of the semiotic, negation/rejection, developed in division two of *Revolution in Poetic Language*.

That is, with Culture, the self-alienating battle between two forms of alienation, Faith and Enlightenment, notably when Hegel analyzes the Enlightenment not being “too enlightened” about itself, Hegel’s French Revolution fails to terminate in the Terror. The form of logic of the Terror is one: “Hegel makes it bitterly clear that the sublime purity of the moral will can be no antidote to the terrifying purity of revolutionary virtue” (Comay 2011, 93) – the threat of it at any moment “reverting to myth,” since by means of this figure, Hegel develops the more general point that Culture, through its abstractly theoretical institutions vis-à-vis an equally abstract symbolic subject, renders biological death indiscernible. Kristeva theorizes the *technē* of memory’s making-material, which is not yet the negative dialectic of an instrumental reason’s tool-making, but rather depends on inscription (Nancy resorts to schematism, above), giving a systematic philosophical foundation made of fractured origins yet to provide the meaning of the human as the horizon of the symbol. “Antigone uncovers a placid energy that cuts the bonds, and effects a de-binding [*déliaison*] that annuls identities and differences in order to install the subject, beyond loss, depression, and suffering, in the *pathos of dispassionating*” (Kristeva 2010, 218; emphasis in original).

My third point is that Creon and Polynices are prelinguistic, and what matters to them is the status and substance of laws; for Kristeva, however, Antigone is linguistic, and what matters to her is intention (the “anticipatory structure” above) toward the law “as” Divine law. That is, the intention toward the being of the law as form – that it “exists,” its essence (e.g., imperceptibility, invisibility) – manifests concretely for another being. This accords with Derrida, who maintains that Antigone institutes a law that is ontological, the unconscious is ontological, it exists, in that it manifests to her concretely. “Her

de-binding [*déliaison*] does not accept [the gods'] 'laws' because these 'are not written laws,' but a sort of trace without representation, which a human being cannot transgress" (Kristeva 2010, 223). Kristeva requires that on the occasion (*Beispiel*) of this example, the addressee reflect the method of experience of the *Phenomenology*. As concerns the ethical law in general, the laws of the gods cannot be transgressed, and Kristeva is right. Yet, within the symbolic, Antigone's action generates the enabling conditions of the laws of the polity, allowing them to be discerned by the polity from the dividing line that separates non-being and being. "More or less than the *dikè* of the gods, it would only be a question of a horizon (*horos*) that Antigone allows herself to aim for, to the point of reflecting it in the radiance of her sovereign identity (Kristeva 2010, 223).

My fourth point concerns Kristeva's 1988 formulation in "L'Impossibilité de perdre," via the Lacan of trauma. In summary – in contrast to Hölderlin, for whom the gods have fled; Kant, for whom the Thing itself has fled; or Heidegger, for whom Being has withdrawn – Kristeva positions what she calls the semiotic subject conceived as discourse, operating as founded on an inner void, a *trauma psychique* rather than a *trauma réel*. She posits a reactivation of retroactive repetition: "Trauma places the subject in relation to the Thing" (Critchley 2009, 1999–216). This trauma, which is premised on the possibility of recollective return, is secondary identification with the mother. The topological ground in the positionality of the Kleinian mother-infant dyad implies an origin that assumes an identity prior to the installment of the subject at the roots of the Oedipal stage, which depends on the preservation of its remainder, *reste*, trace. *Trauma psychique* is methodologically anterior to memory in the formation of the psychic life of the child.

Conclusion. Dual Semiotic Authority, the Collapse of Psychic Space in Modernity, and the Necessity of Myth in Kristeva's Development of Love Transference

In "L'Impossibilité de perdre," Kristeva distances herself from Lacan and his view of sublimation. She articulates her view of traumatism in relation to the archaic maternal: "in commenting on the notion of *das Ding* [the thing] in Freud's *Entwurf*, Lacan claims that however withdrawn the Freudian Thing may be from judging

consciousness, it is always already given in the presence of language” (qtd. in Critchley 1999, 216). Kristeva tells us that affect is anterior to language, that it is generative of significance and yet cannot be signified in language. How do we conceptualize affect through the archaic maternal repressed? All efforts to breach, separate from, and master the semiotic implode within the symbolic. Into the 1990s, this shattering is central to Kristeva’s concept of intimate revolt. Affect as oppositional force, as a capacity of psychic or semiotic retroaction, is the means through which traumatism enters, breaching the symbolic.

In other words, Kristeva focuses on the “infantile event” as a structural precondition of trauma, and she contrasts this to Lacan’s view of the subversion of the subject – specifically in the structure of “subject/other.” As Kristeva argues, this revives the point of the “original unknown” of the origin of so-called trauma: “*ce n’est pas un événement originaire, mais un second, réactivant le premier, qui constitue de cet ‘inconnu originaire’ un trauma*” (Kristeva 1988, 30).

Trauma réel and *trauma psychique* constitute the central feature of this claim. Kristeva brings the “I” to the vital necessity of embarking on an existential choice, that of individuation as subject, living in the world with others. This implies asserting the law of the sociohistorical symbolic order and affirming subordination to its consequences. As a speaking being, the capacity to live an independent life with others depends on the ability to renounce difference, yet this simultaneously entails a refusal of differentiation from the perceived and real object of one’s being a whole, since a connection must be preserved to having-been. At the foundation of the production of symbolic equations, Kristeva will situate the story of the fourth negation, *rejet* as a productive rejection, along with the cooperation of the symbolic, semiotic, and thetic. In this way, she affirms an ideality larger than the atomism of an ego-based identity of the subject can admit. Kristeva further posits that, without assuming the existence of “pre-psychical memory,” the “word,” the meaning and interpretation of the symbol of the “good,” does not understand itself with reference to its function. The complex of acquiring consciousness and its time-space, a “pre-psychical memory” or “memory-trace,” cannot be symbolized in the subject. Instead, Kristeva writes, symbolization requires attention to the uncanny experience of the “memory-trace, whose repetition is unaware of time, can sometimes seep into very concealed, elaborate, and sublimatory formations and mark them with the unsettling strangeness of the

atemporal” (Kristeva 2002, 35). The symbol symbolizes by “splitting” the subject (who cannot symbolize debt in relation to her creditors, e.g., the parental other and consciousness) and thus symbolizes by splitting the universal at the very foundation of its “origin” in consciousness (in a relation of debt to the “gift,” e.g., the somatization of “body”).

To return this to Hegel and the Unhappy Consciousness, sandwiched between the classical chapters on Desire and the Ethical Order, I have prepared the path to show that, for Kristeva, Antigone already inaugurates the more complex negativity of Hegel’s Unhappy Consciousness.

In brief, Hegel here turns the dialectic from a negative to a positive relation—one of love. He asserts that the “single individual consciousness is in itself Absolute Essence” (Hegel 1977, M231), which is the turning point of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. The triad that constitutes this unity has three moments: the single individual consciousness, the mediator, and lastly Absolute Essence. The binding relation of this unity, in its “prerational” conception, is one of pure negativity. This unity as a whole is what constitutes the Unhappy Consciousness. It is only through achieving Unhappy Consciousness, or the third form (consciousness and self-consciousness being the previous two), that negativity changes into a new relation, a positive relation, that is, a negated negation. The first act is to drop the middle term, the mediator who is “the unity directly aware of both [the first and the second], and connecting them” (Hegel 1977, M231). This mediator is aware that it is itself a consciousness and acts so as to link the single individual consciousness and Absolute Essence. Significantly, when this mediator is dropped, the individual consciousness is now aware of itself as a reliable mediator to Absolute Essence; it can now understand unity for itself as well as possess awareness of the Thing.

As with every new beginning, with making room for new acts, new things in the world, in Kristeva the child constitutes the inception of the mother-child link. Hegel’s self-consciousness started as a negation only concerning itself with its independence and freedom: both Independence and Freedom. But in light of the process that it *worked* via this negative relation, realizing the limitations of both its independence and freedom, reason allowed it to preserve the unity of independence and freedom by being at peace with the world. Maternal love, the dialectic of hate and forgiveness, as per Kristeva’s secondary identification with the mother, is modeled on this.

References

- Adorno, Theodor W. 2008. *History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-65*, edited by Rolf Tiedemann. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. London: Polity.
- Balsam, Rosemary. 2014. "The Embodied Mother: Commentary on Kristeva," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 62, no. 1 (February 2014): 87–100.
- Beardsworth, Sara. 2004. *Julia Kristeva: Psychoanalysis and Modernity*. New York: SUNY Press.
- . 2017. "The Chiasmus of Action and Revolt: Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, and Gillian Rose." In *New Forms of Revolt: Essays on Kristeva's Intimate Politics*, edited by S. K. Hansen and Rebecca Tuvel, 43–67. New York: SUNY Press.
- Butler, Judith. 2000. *Antigone's Claim*. London: Routledge.
- . 2003. *Bodies that Matter*. London: Routledge.
- Comay, Rebecca. 2011. *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- . "Resistance and Repetition: Hegel and Freud." In *Hegel and Resistance: History, Politics and Dialectics*, edited by Rebecca Comay and Bart Zantvoort, 35–57. London: Bloomsbury.
- Critchley, Simon. 2009. *Ethics–Politics–Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought*. London: Verso.
- Derrida, Jacques. 2005. "Preface." In Catherine Malabou, *The Future of Hegel*. Translated by Lisabeth During. London: Routledge.
- . 2022 [1961]. *Penser, c'est dire non*. Paris: Seuil.
- Gearhart, Suzanne. 1998. "The Remnants of Philosophy: Psychoanalysis After Glas." In *Hegel After Derrida*, edited by Stuart Barnett. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hansen, S. K. and Rebecca Tuvel, "Introduction." In *New Forms of Revolt: Essays on Kristeva's Intimate Politics*, edited by S. K. Hansen and Rebecca Tuvel, 1–14. New York: SUNY Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 1977. *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1991. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, edited by Allen W. Wood. Translated by H. B. Nissbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1997. *Hegel's Science of Logic*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

- Houlgate, Stephen. 2006. *The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
- Kristeva, Julia. 1984 [1974]. *Revolution in Poetic Language*. Translated by Margaret Waller. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 1988. "L'Impossibilité de perdre," *Les Cahiers de l'Institut de Psycho-Pathologie Clinique* 8 (November 1988), special issue on "Trauma réel, trauma psychique."
- . 2002. *Intimate Revolt: The Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis*, volume 2. Translated by Jeanine Herman. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2010 [2005]. *Hatred and Forgiveness*. Translated by Jeanine Herman. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2010. "Antigone: Limit and Horizon." In *Feminist Readings of Antigone*, edited by Fanny Söderbäck, 215–31. New York: SUNY Press.
- Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. 1989. *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, edited by Christopher Fynsk. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lawlor, Len. 2016. *Striking Violence and Speaking Out*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Lechte, John. 1990. "Art, Love, and Melancholy in the Work of Julia Kristeva." In *Abjection, Melancholia and Love*, edited by John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin, 24–41. London: Routledge.
- Malabou, Catherine. 2005. *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic*. Translated by Lisabeth During. London: Routledge.
- Morin, Marie-Eve. 2022. *Merleau-Ponty and Nancy on Sense and Being: At the Limits of Phenomenology*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. 2000. *Being Singular Plural*. Translated by Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Nelson, Eric S. 2014. "Heidegger, Levinas, and the Other of History." In *Between Levinas and Heidegger*, edited by John E. Drabinski and Eric S. Nelson, 75–84. New York: SUNY Press.
- Nuzzo, Angelica. 1999. "The Idea of 'Method' in Hegel's Science of Logic—a Method for Finite Thinking and Absolute Reason," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 1–2, nos. 39–40: 1–17.
- Sjöholm, Cecilia. 2006. *Kristeva and the Political*. London: Routledge.

- Söderbäck, Fanny. 2010. "Introduction." In *Feminist Readings of Antigone*, edited by Fanny Söderbäck, 1–13. New York: SUNY Press.
- Stawarska, Beata. 2017. "Language as *Poeisis*: Productivity and Forms of Resistance in Kristeva and Saussure." In *New Forms of Revolt: Essays on Kristeva's Intimate Politics*, edited by S. K. Hansen and Rebecca Tuvel, 129–155. New York: SUNY Press.
- Thompson, Kevin. 2019. *Hegel's Theory of Normativity: The Systematic Foundations of the Philosophical Science of Right*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Watkin, William. 2003. "Melancholia, Revolution and Materiality in the Work of Julia Kristeva." *Paragraph* 26, no. 3 (November 2003): 86–107.
- Zambrana, Rocio. 2015. *Hegel's Theory of Intelligibility*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.